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Abstract
We consider the simplified model of strategic allocation of trajectories in the airspace presented in [1]. Two
types of companies, characterized by different cost functions, compete for allocation of trajectories in the
airspace. We study how the equilibrium state of the model depends on the traffic demand and number of
airports. We show that in a mixed population environment the equilibrium solution is not the optimal at the
global level, but rather than it tends to have a larger fraction of companies who prefer to delay the departure
time rather taking a longer routes. Finally we study the evolutionary dynamics investigating the fluctuations
of airline types around the equilibrium and the speed of convergence toward it in finite populations. We find
that the equilibrium point is shifted by the presence of noise and is reached more slowly.
Keywords: Air Traffic Management, Strategic allocation, Evolutionary dynamics, Agent Based Models,
Complex systems, Network science
1. Introduction
Transportation systems have a crucial importance for countries because of their social and economical
impacts. The air transportation in particular is closely linked to the economical development of the areas in
which it unfolds. This is why it is very important for policy makers to ensure a smooth development, even –
and especially – in areas where the traffic increase forecasts are the highest. Indeed, the air traffic system will
get closer and closer to its actual capacity, especially in Europe and in the US where the traffic could increase
by 50% in the next 20 years [25]. As a consequence, it is important for the air traffic management world 1)
to forecast the consequences on the current infrastructures and procedures and 2) to find the appropriate
solutions to cope with the increase. For this reason, large investment programs like SESAR in Europe and
SingleSky in the USA have been launched.
Apart from airport capacity, one of the important bottlenecks for the increasing traffic flow will be the
sectors, where the controller needs to actively separate flights in order to avoid conflicts. However, solving
conflicts in areas of high traffic complexity is a demanding task, already nowadays. With the increase in
traffic, the cognitive capacities of air traffic controllers will likely reach their limits and drastically increase the
number of conflicts or cap the capacities of the sectors. As a consequence, navigating through the European
sky will become more and more difficult in the future and will require more careful planning capacities for the
network manager and for the airlines. In other words the airspace is becoming a scarce resource, especially
in congested situations, like, for example, during major shutdowns of large areas (extreme weather, strikes,
volcano eruptions, etc).
It is thus expected that the airlines will compete fiercely for two of the most important resources: time
and space. More specifically, it is foreseen that the allocation of slots at the airports will change and include
market-driven elements like bids. On the other end, the airspace will be more densely populated and the
airlines will also have to compete for it. From the point of view of the transportation companies, this
increases the effort required to find better route allocation strategies, whose success depends, among other
things, on the strategies adopted by the other users.
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Therefore in this paper we consider the allocation of the flight plans on the airspace from the point of
view of the dynamics on a complex network. This point of view is fruitfully used in different fields, like
dynamics of epidemiology, information propagation on the Internet, percolation, opinion spreading, systemic
risk, etc [5, 6]. Recently, an increasing attention is being devoted to the network description of transport
systems [7], in particular the air transport system [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 2, 14]; for a recent review see [15].
The present study follows this stream of literature, which allows to use powerful tool to extract the main
characteristic of a system, regardless on the specific details of the real system.
More specifically, we present here a simplified model based on the agent-based paradigm, particularly
well suited to the problem [24]. The model describes the strategic allocation of flight plans on an idealized
airspace, considered as a network of interconnected sectors. The sectors are capacity-constrained, which
means that the companies might not get their optimal solutions regarding the flight plans. Thus, they will
fall back to suboptimal solutions, for which they will develop different strategies. By using two different
strategies for companies, we show how different factors explain the satisfaction of different types of company.
Some of these factors (the network topology and the departing times) can be regulated externally by the
policy maker, while others (the mixing composition) depend on the airline population and market forces. We
then study the evolutionary dynamics of the populations by considering a “reproduction” rate based on their
past satisfaction, which acts as a fitness function. We show that this dynamics exhibits an equilibrium point
which is distinct from the optimal point for the system. Moreover, the fluctuations around the equilibrium
and the convergence time may hinder the convergence in practice.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present briefly the model. In section 3, we present
the conclusions that we drew using an earlier version of the model with only one route (two airports) and
no dynamics. In section 4, we present some new results on the static equilibrium of the model, concerning
(i) the behaviors of the airlines in different situations (ii) the effect of the infrastructure, i.e. the number of
airports and in section 5 we investigate the population dynamics in an evolutionary environment. Finally,
we draw some conclusions in section 6.
2. Presentation of the Model
In this section we present the agent based model. We will give a brief description, whereas more details
can be found in [1] where the model has been introduced. The implementation of the model is open and
can be freely downloaded for any non-commercial purpose [29]. A more detailed version of the model with
a tactical part is also available [26, 28].
The model describes the strategic allocation of trajectories in the airspace. Mimicking what is done in
the European airspace, the model considers airlines who submit their flight plans to the network manager
(NM). The NM checks whether accepting the flight plan(s) would lead to a sector capacity violation. If this
is not the case the flight plan is accepted, otherwise it is rejected and the airline submits the second best
flight plan (according to its utility function). The process goes on until a flight plan is accepted or a maximal
number of rejected flight plans is reached and the flight is canceled. The NM keeps track of the allocated
flights and checks violations of newly submitted flight plans responding in a determined way to the requests,
without making counter-propositions.
Airspace. The airspace is modeled as a network of sectors. Topological properties of the real networks
of sectors have been investigated in [2]. Each sector has a capacity, here fixed to 5 for all sectors. Some of
these sectors contain airports (see below for more details on our choices) and the geometry of a flight plan
is a path connecting two airports. A flight plan specifies also the departing time (see next point).
Airlines. The main agents of the model are the Airline Operators (AOs) who try to obtain the best
trajectories for their flights and the Network Manager who accepts or rejects the flight plans. In the simplified
version we assume that the quality of a trajectory depends on its length (the shorter, the better) and the
discrepancy between the desired and actual departing/arrival time (the smaller, the better). Companies
might be different depending on the relative weight of two components in their cost or utility function.
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Companies caring more of length are called of type “S” (for shifting) companies, since when their flight plan
is rejected by the NM, they prefer to delay the flight but keeping a short trip length. Companies caring more
of departure punctuality are called of type “R” (for rerouting), since when the flight plan is rejected they
prefer to depart on time even if they need to use a longer route to destination. Note that in the following
the AOs have only one flight. Hence in our model the optimization takes place after the previous, bigger
strategic allocation of flights where AOs decides or not to operate the route, with which aircraft, etc. For
this reason, all the optimization here are independent from each other for each flight, except through the
capacity constraints on the network.
More quantitatively, for each flight an AO chooses a departing and arrival airport, a desired departing
time, t0, and selects a number Nfp of flight plans. The k−th flight plan, k = 1, ..., Nfp, is the pair (tk0 ,pk),
where tk0 is the desired time of departure and p
k is an ordered set containing the sequence of sectors in the
flight plan. The flight plans are selected by an AO according to its cost function. In our model it has the
form
c(tk0 ,p
k) = αL(pk) + β(tk0 − t0), (1)
where L(pk) is the length of the path on the network (i.e. the sum of the lengths of the edges followed by
the flight). We also assume that flights are only shifted ahead in time (tk0 ≥ t0) by an integer multiple of a
parameter τ which is taken here as 20 minutes (all duration in this article are in minutes unless specified
otherwise). The parameters α and β define the main characteristics of the company. Given the discussion
above, companies R have β/α 1, while companies S have β/α 1.
Departing waves. As it was shown in [1], an important determinant of the allocations is the desired
departing time t0 chosen by the AO. We assume that departing times are drawn from a distribution inside
the day characterized by a certain number of peaks or waves.
Figure 1: Example of pattern of departure times (departing waves) with Np = 5 peaks (∆t = 4) and fS = 0.4. The blue bars
are the desired departing times while the red bars are the actual departing times after the allocation by the NM has been done.
We define first Td as the length of the “day” (in minutes), i.e. the time window of departure for all
flights. In this time window, we define Np peaks of 60 minutes, by setting a time ∆t between the end of the
peak and the beginning of the next one (thus, Np = Td/(∆t + 60)). The parameter Td is fixed to 24 hours
in the following. Figure 1 shows an example of departing waves. Then we define a total number of flights
Nf and divide them equally between peaks. In the following, we also use the corresponding time density
d = Nf/24, i.e. the average number of flights per hour.
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Dynamics. Given a mixed population of AOs of different types, at each time step, an AO is selected
randomly1. The AO chooses the departing and arrival airports and the desired departing time t0 for its
flight, drawing it from the departing time distribution. It then computes the Nfp best flight plans for the
flight according to its cost function and submits them, one by one in increasing order of cost, to the NM. The
NM accepts the first flight plan which does not cross overloaded sectors, i.e. at already maximal capacity.
If none of the Nfp flight plans is accepted, the flight is rejected and the satisfaction of the AO for this flight
is set to 0.
Metrics. The metric measuring the satisfaction (or fitness) of a company about a given flight f is
Sf = cbestf /cacceptedf , (2)
where cbestf is the cost of the optimal flight plan for the flight f according to the AO cost function (i.e. the
first flight plan to be submitted for the flight), and cacceptedf is the cost of the flight plan eventually accepted
for this flight. If no flight plan has been accepted, we set Sf to 0. Note that Sf is always between 0 and 1.
The value 1 is obtained when the best flight plan is accepted.
Since the AOs have only one flight here, the satisfaction of a flight is also the satisfaction of its company.
When several companies have the same type (same ratio β/α), we make use of the average satisfactions across
them. For instance, SS and SR are respectively the average satisfactions of companies S with β/α 1 and
R with β/α  1. Finally, we use also the average satisfaction across all flights as a measure of the global
satisfaction of the system:
STOT = fS × SS + fR × SR, (3)
where fi and Si are the fraction of flights and the average satisfaction of company i, respectively, and
fS + fR = 1.
The simulations we describe hereafter are obtained for type of airspace different from the one used in
Ref.[1]. In order have a more controlled environment, we generate a triangular network with 50 nodes. Each
node of the network represents the center of an hexagonal sector. Sectors are linked to each of their neighbors.
In order to avoid paths having exactly the same duration, which could lead to ties in the optimization, we
sample the crossing times between sectors from a log-normal distribution so as to have a 20 minutes average
and a very small variance (inferior to 10−4 minutes).
The number of airports available to the air companies can be chosen before the simulation. Unless
specified otherwise, we fix the number of airports to 5. In the following, we present results in which we drew
10 times the airports randomly, then ran 100 independent simulations on each of these realizations.
The previous setup is very stylized but allows to catch the main features of the model. In Appendix A
we present some robustness checks of the model by considering two more realistic setups. In the first one
we consider a scale free network of airports, i.e. not all the airports are equivalent in terms of number of
flights/destinations, but hubs and spokes are present. In the second we use real ECAC data to construct
the network of sectors, the sector of capacities, the origin/destination frequencies, and the wave structure.
We find that the results are indeed similar to the ones presented thereafter for the stylized model, where a
much more controlled setting is used.
3. Competition over a single route
Ref. [1] considered the model in a static setting with only two airports. Static means that no evolutionary
dynamics has been considered. Ref. [1] showed that with a single type of company, there is a (congestion)
transition, much like the congestion observed in other transport systems, e.g. car traffic, when the number of
1The random order of arrival of bids is chosen to guarantee that neither type of company has an advantage because it arrives
first to the network manager.
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flights becomes too large. When two extreme types of companies (R and S) are competing for the airspace,
ref. [1] showed that there exists a unique fraction of mixing corresponding to a stable Nash equilibrium.
The strategies are interacting positively, leading to an absolute maximum in satisfaction for the overall
system at a mixing fraction different from 0 and 1. Finally, by performing extensive simulations, ref. [1]
showed that overlaps between different possible paths connecting two airports is an important determinant
of the possibility to gain advantage from a rerouting, impacting directly the satisfaction of companies R and
indirectly the one of companies S.
Compared with [1], the main innovations presented here are:
• We consider a more realistic setting with multiple airports and we study the relation between number
of flights and number of airports such that the satisfaction of airlines is preserved.
• We study the specific mechanism linking the structure of the paths on the network, the overlap, to the
increase in traffic on this network.
• We consider an evolutionary setting where the capability of a type of company of continuing its business
depends on the past satisfaction.
4. Static equilibrium
We first compare the general output of the simulations to the case where there is only one connection
and two airports. For this, we study directly the case where we have two different types of company, S
and R, which are competing on the airspace. Note that each company has only one flight, whose pair
origin/destination is drawn randomly from the available ones.
4.1. Departing patterns and mixed populations
Our first aim is to understand how the satisfaction of each type of company depends on its environment.
For this, we fix the number of flights (to Nf = 24 × d = 480 here) and we change the proportion fS
of companies of type S present in the airspace. This last parameter will be called mixing parameter in
the following. We also change the structure of the wave pattern, by changing the parameter ∆t, defined
previously.
Figures 2 and 3 show the satisfaction of the two types of company as a function of ∆t for different values
of the mixing parameter. The results for companies R are quite intuitive. These companies are better off
when they are competing with a large fraction of companies S (figure 3 left) and when there are more waves,
i.e. when ∆t is small (figure 2 left). This is expected, since more waves means more “space” for companies
when the number of flights is fixed. Moreover, companies R have a stronger dependency on the mixing
parameter when the number of waves is small, i.e. ∆t is big. In other word, they compete more strongly
with each other in this case. Note that the plateau present for ∆t ∈ [700, 1300] is due to the fact that for
this range of parameter, the number of waves is constant and they are far from each other. Indeed, for this
range, there are only two peaks, which come slowly apart as ∆t increases. Since they are sufficiently apart,
the flights from the previous wave do not interact with the flights in the next one, and the satisfaction do
not change with ∆t. In other words, the first flight from the second wave departs after the last flight from
the first wave arrives.
The effect of the environment is more complex for companies S. Indeed, for some values of the mixing
parameter fS , their satisfaction is not monotonous with ∆t. This behaviour is explained by the following
trade-off. On one hand, the bigger ∆t is, the less waves there are. Hence companies are competing effectively
with a higher number of other companies, which is the reason behind the decreasing curve of companies R
in the left panel of figure 2. On the other hand, companies S have a strategy where they try to delay their
flight if the first flight plan is rejected. This means that if the waves are too close to each other, the delayed
flight plans will likely conflict with the flights in the next wave. For this reason, their satisfaction increases
5
Figure 2: Satisfaction of companies as a function of the time ∆t between waves. Different lines refer to different mixing
parameters. The number of airports is 5 and the number of flights is 20 × 24. Left: satisfaction of companies R. Right:
satisfaction of companies S.
Figure 3: Effect of the mixing parameter on the satisfaction for different wave patterns. The number of airports is 5 and the
number of flight is 20 × 24. Left: satisfaction of companies R. Right: satisfaction of companies S.
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at the beginning when the waves comes apart and then decreases when the waves are further apart and in
smaller number.
Note that first effect – the decrease of satisfaction due to concentration within waves – is less significant
when companies S compete with many R companies. Indeed, in this case, their increasing concentration
within a wave is of little importance for them, because they can always shift their flight plan two or three
times to get out of the wave and not conflict anymore with companies of type R. For this reason, their curve
is monotonous with ∆t for high values of the mixing parameter. More strikingly, their satisfaction is higher
for very high ∆t than for very small ones if fS << 1.
Hence, the companies are reacting differently to different environment (waves) because they are sensitive
to different mechanisms. The interplay of the mechanisms lead to interesting patterns that translate in
interesting behaviours when framing the model in an evolutionary environment. But before coming to this,
we inspect in the following section the effect of the density of airports on the companies.
4.2. Effect of the density of airports
The increase of the number of airports in real airspaces has some obvious impact. In our model, for a fixed
number of flights, increasing the number of airports leads to more potential routes and thus less interactions
between flights. However, it is not clear whether this effect is similar to a decrease of the number of flights
with a fixed number of airports. In order to investigate this problem, we repeat some simulations with
constant parameters ∆t = 60× 5 and fS = 0.5 but with different number of flights and different number of
airports.
The results are presented in figure 4. As one can see on the left panel, the average satisfaction decreases
with the number of flights, and increases with the number of airports. In order to find a relationship between
both parameters, we rescaled the abscissa by d/nαairpt, trying to find the value of α where the curves would
collapse the best. Purely empirically, we found that α ' 0.15 is the best match that we could get, except
for very low numbers of airports, for which the curve does not collapse well with the others (see right of
figure 4). We do not have an analytical argument to ground this scaling, but we suspect that it is linked to
the degree of the network, since α = 0.15 ' 1/6, and 6 is the degree of the triangular lattice on which the
airspace is embedded.
Figure 4: Satisfaction against density for different number of airports. Bother parameters seem to have opposed effects. Left:
non-rescaled plot. Right: the abscissa is rescaled by d/n0.15airpt.
Whatever the reason is behind the exact scaling, it is thus obvious that both parameters play some
inverted roles. Roughly speaking, more airports give more choices to companies, and more flights “fill” these
choices. In order to captures this point, we computed a metric Q that we call “overlap” and which represents
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how much the paths open to companies are similar to each other. More specifically, if p1 and p2 are two
paths on the network, we compute first:
Qp1,p2 =
p1 ∩ p2
p1 ∪ p2 ,
which is simply the number of common nodes (sectors) in p1 and p2 divided by the total number of unique
sectors in p1 and p2. To compute an aggregated value, we consider all flight plans computed by the companies,
i.e. including also the suboptimal ones. From them, we consider all the paths contained in the flight plans,
and we compute the overlap between ALL the pairs of possible paths to obtain Q. Note that this metric
does not consider the time at all, so it might be that two flight plans with the same path actually departs
at very different times and have no chance of interacting. This could be called a “static” overlap, but we
consider this metric because it is simple and it is very specific to the network, rather than the companies
themselves. Even with this simple metrics, one can catch an interesting feature of the model.
Left panel of figure 5 shows the overlap as a function of the number of airports in the airspace. As
expected, the overlap between potential paths decreases with the number of airports. The overlap is a very
physical quantity, which have a tight connection with the number of flights. Indeed, when one opens a path
on the network, in average to capacities of the other paths to accept flights decrease by Q. So the “density”
of flights per route is effectively QNf/Nroutes, where Nroutes is the total number of routes. Since the average
satisfaction is likely to be a function of this density, all curves for different number of flights and different
number of airports should scale as Qd. This is exactly the result we obtain in the right panel of figure 5,
where we plot the total satisfaction against Qd. As expected, all the curves collapse very well.
Figure 5: Left: Overlap between paths as a function of the number of airports in the airspace. Right: Total satisfaction against
Q · d for different densities and overlap. The curves collapse very well.
This result shows that the effect of a change of a number of airports can be deduced from the effect of
a change in traffic, or vice versa. It has a very practical impact, which is that the simulations can be run
on different number of airports, or different number of flights, but not necessarily both. This is why in the
following we keep the number of airports to 5, and only study the effect of variations of density. It could have
also a more general impact, in the sense that if the results would hold on a more realistic airspace (which
should be the case because of the general scope of the overlap metric), a policy maker could for instance try
to push for the creation of new airports to counter balance increasing traffic. This, of course, suppose that
the demand is constant and not too localized (i.e. an additional airport in a big city).
4.3. Global satisfaction: equilibrium state
As seen in section 4.1, the effect of the environment properties on the satisfaction of two types of companies
is different. What is not clear yet is the exact interplay of the mechanisms and the resulting difference of
8
satisfaction of the populations. In figure 6 we plot the difference of satisfactions ∆S between population S
and population R, as a function of the mixing parameter fS and for several values of ∆t. In the left panel,
the density of flights is quite small (d = 20), corresponding to the one used in figures 2 and 3. On the right
panel we show the result for a much higher density (d = 80), corresponding to a congested airspace.
Figure 6: Difference of satisfaction ∆S between companies S and companies R versus the mixing parameters for different values
of ∆t. Left: low density of flights, d = 20. Right: high density of flights, d = 80.
The difference of satisfaction ∆S between the two populations depends heavily on the two parameters.
At both densities, the first values of ∆t are clearly crippling population S, since in this configuration ∆S
is always negative. This is due to the fact that very frequent waves prevent companies S to delay their
flight, whereas companies R can find available path by suitable rerouting. For higher values of ∆t, the
situation becomes more favourable to companies S, since the difference is usually positive. The details of the
variations of the difference are quite complex with the two parameters, but it is clear it is always decreasing
monotonically with fS . The point where it crosses 0 varies with ∆t but not wildly (except for small ∆t).
It is worth noting that these curves can be considered as fitness curves for two populations competing
for the same resources in a given environment. If the higher fitness affects positively future reproduction
rate (i.e. the possibility of continuing and expanding business), we show in section 5 how to study the
dynamics of the two populations in an evolutionary framework. Here we simply recall that the points where
the difference of fitness curves vanish (i.e. its roots) are equilibrium points for the dynamics. The existence
of a single root (as in Fig. 6) shows that there is only one equilibrium point (a part the two absorbing states
at fS = 0 and fS = 1). The slope of ∆S at its root measures the stability. Since the slope we observe is
negative, the equilibrium is stable. In other words, when the proportion of companies S is too high, their
satisfaction/fitness decreases, thus giving a lower reproduction rate for them, favoring companies R, and
driving back the system towards the equilibrium.
Another important question in this kind of system is whether the equilibrium point is optimal also for
the system. For this reason we compute also the global satisfaction, Eq. 3, which is the average satisfaction
of all the flights. A higher global satisfaction means that globally the system is in a better shape, leading to
increased profits for airlines and possibly better service for passengers. In the left panel of figure 7 we show
the value of the global satisfaction as a function of the mixing parameter fS for different values of ∆t. The
first conclusion is that the global satisfaction is usually better for 0 < fS < 1 than for pure populations. This
should not be a surprise, because we saw that each population performs better against the other one. This
is the typical case where different populations have different niches and thus their interaction is beneficial
for both. The second conclusion is that for all values of ∆t, there exists a unique maximum and its position
varies with ∆t.
On the right panel of figure 7, we plot both the global optimum, extracted from the left panel, and the
equilibrium point, extracted from the left panel of figure 6. Both exhibit similar variations. For small values
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Figure 7: Left: average satisfaction of all companies against the mixing parameters for different wave patterns. Right: evolution
of the maximum satisfaction and the equilibrium point as a function of ∆t.
of ∆t, the equilibrium point and the global optimum are both at fS ' 0. When ∆t increases, companies S
increase their advantage against companies R because they are not troubled by the next wave. Then both
values decrease, to stabilize at value fS > 0.5, showing the greater advantage of companies S when the
departing pattern is composed by well separated waves.
More importantly, both curves are clearly distinct for ∆t & 100, even considering error bars. This is an
important result, because it shows that the equilibrium mixing condition is not the optimal at the global
level. In particular the evolution of the system toward its equilibrium mixing would tend to favour drastically
population S, whereas the global optimum would be reached with a much smaller market share of companies
S. This is exactly where policy makers should step in and issue policies driving the system to the optimum.
5. Evolutionary Dynamics and Equilibrium
In the previous section, we interpreted the satisfaction of each company as its fitness when competing
with the others for the same resources – namely time and space. Interpreting these fitnesses as the capability
of expanding business, it is possible to develop a dynamical evolutionary model for studying the dynamics
toward equilibrium and its fluctuations, as well as the role of finite size populations.
In our model each type of company has a population size at time t+ 1 which depends on its satisfaction
at time t. In order to keep the simulations under reasonable computational time, and following what is done
in evolutionary biology models [3] we keep the total population fixed. This means that only the mixing
parameter fS is changing between time t and t + 1. For the reproduction rule, we use an exponential
reproduction, i.e. the rate of reproduction of a population is proportional to its fitness and its current
population. Combined to the fixed population conditions, this leads to a discretized version of the so-called
replicator model [3]:
f t+1S = f
t
S + ∆St f
t
S (1− f tS),
where f tS is the mixing parameter at time t and ∆St is the difference in satisfaction between companies S
and R at time t. In the simulations, we also choose to always keep the number of companies of each kind
to a minimum of 1. This ensures that the equilibria at fS = 0 and fS = 1 do not act as absorbing barriers
(sinks). Indeed, since the populations are finite, a small non-null f tS could lead to exactly 0 company S,
which leads in turn to f t
′
S = 0 for all t
′ > t. Analogously the same happens when f tS = 1. Note that all
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other parameters (∆t, number of airports, airpspace structure, etc) are being kept constant throughout the
reproduction process, i.e. the environment is stable.
Figure 8: Evolution of the mixing parameters with the generations, averaged over 100 realizations (and only one network
realization). The blue lines are the averages, the violets lines are exponential fits, and the error bars are the average standard
deviations. The coefficients of determination of the regressions are over 0.98. Left: ∆t = 23 × 60. Right: ∆t = 0.
Figure 8 shows the results of the simulations for two distinct values of ∆t. The plots show the evolution of
the mixing parameter with time (i.e. the number of generations). The solid blue lines are averages over 100
runs and the solid violet lines represent the results of exponential fits. Both lines are well fitted (R2 > 0.98),
and the equilibrium is clearly reached in both cases. On the left, there is only one wave of departure, thus
companies S have an advantage and the point of equilibrium for fS is above 0.5. On contrary, the figure on
the right shows that when there are no waves (∆t = 0), companies S are very disadvantaged, and the point
of equilibrium is close to 0. Note that both figures are roughly consistent with figure 6 on the left, where the
difference in fitness ∆S has a root close to 0 when ∆t = 0 and has a root close to 0.7 when ∆t = 23× 60.
To investigate more in detail the difference between the two results, in figure 9 we plot the position of the
equilibrium point – computed by averaging the last 40 generations in each run – as a function of ∆t. The plot
is directly comparable to the right panel of figure 7, since all the other parameters are the same. The curves
are roughly similar, but the one obtained with evolutionary dynamics displays larger values of fS , especially
around ∆t = 3× 60, than the static one. It can be shown that the stochasticity of the fitness function can
lead to such a result, see Appendix B. This is an important results, because the noise coming from the
fitness function can drive the equilibrium even further from the global optimum than in the deterministic
case.
We now consider how the system converges to the equilibrium and how external parameters like ∆t
influences the convergence. It is worth reminding the link between the fluctuations around the equilibrium
and the shape of the fitness functions. Indeed in the continuous version of the replicator model, the stability
of the equilibrium is given by the slope of the difference of fitnesses at its root [3]. Higher absolute slopes
translate into a higher stability and faster convergence to the steady state. However our system does not
have a deterministic fitness function, since the satisfaction depends on the specific realization of the model.
This additional noise, directly linked to the mechanisms embedded in the model, affects both the fluctuations
around the equilibrium and the time of convergence in general. In Appendix B, we briefly show analytically
why this is the case.
The magnitude of the fluctuations around the equilibrium are depicted on the left panel of figure 10.
There is a weak trend towards bigger fluctuations when ∆t increases but their magnitude reaches a plateau
quickly. Note that the standard deviation is far from between negligible, implying that the fluctuations are
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Figure 9: Evolution of the equilibrium coming from the evolutionary simulations with ∆t.
typically 15% of the value of the equilibrium point. This means that the static analysis performed in section
4 is far from revealing all the features of the model.
Figure 10: Left: evolution of the standard deviation of the value of fS when the equilibrium is reached against ∆t. Right:
Typical number of generations before the equilibrium is reached (time to equilibrium) as a function of ∆t.
The time of convergence to equilibrium is plotted in the same figure on the right panel. This is the
characteristic time obtained by fitting the f tS with an exponential function of time. This time scale is quite
high for small values of ∆t – where the fluctuations are small – but decreases to a small value (around 7 or
8 generations) when ∆t increases – where the fluctuations are high. As already stated, the magnitude of the
fluctuations depends on two independent mechanisms, the variance of the fitness function and its slope. In
order to understand which mechanism plays a major role, we performed a regression with an ordinary least-
square procedure. The dependent variable is the inverse of the time to equilibrium, and the two explanatory
variables are σS , the standard deviation of the fitness function around the equilibrium point, and γ, the
slope of the fitness function. The results of the regression are presented in table 1.
The regression is very good, with the coefficient of determination of 0.94. Both variables impacts neg-
atively the inverse of time to equilibrium. This is expected, since a higher variance of the fitness function
should increase the time to equilibrium, as well as a higher slope (because the slope is negative). Finally, we
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Variable Weight Std. err. t-test Conf. Int.
Const 0.0911 0.023 0.004 [0.038, 0.144]
σS -0.2588 0.046 0.001 [-0.366, -0.152]
γ -0.1279 0.029 0.002 [-0.196, -0.060]
Table 1: Results of the ordinary least square regression of 1/tau with the estimated parameters, the standard errors, the
p-values of a t-test, and the 5% - 95% confidence intervals. The coefficient of determination is R2 = 0.94.
Variable Weight Std. err. t-test Conf. Int.
Const 0.0101 0.008 0.244 [-0.008, 0.029]
σS -0.0338 0.016 0.071 [-0.071, 0.004]
γ -0.0226 0.010 0.059 [-0.046, 0.001]
Table 2: Results of the ordinary least square regression of the fluctuations of the mixing parameter with the estimated param-
eters, the standard errors, the p-values of a t-test, and the 5% - 95% confidence intervals. The coefficient of determination is
R2 = 0.74.
can conclude that both mechanisms play an important role, since both coefficients are similar in magnitude.
Note however that the variance of the fitness function is twice as important as the slope to determine the
dynamics of the system. As a consequence, one cannot simply infer the dynamics from the static consider-
ations made in section 4. Finally, we show in figure 11 the graphical results of the regression, plus a plot
showing the variation of 1/τ against the expression found analytically (see Appendix B). The agreement is
worse than with the regression, which might be due to the fact that the analytical model is linearised around
the equilibrium, whereas the system can in fact start quite far from it.
Figure 11: Inverse of time to equilibrium versus a combination of the standard deviation and the slope of the fitness function.
Left: the weights are the results of an ordinary least square (R2 = 0.94) regression. The solid red line shows the results of the
regression. Right: the weights are coming from analytical arguments. The solid red line is a linear regression (R2 = 0.67).
The same procedure can be used to study the fluctuations around the equilibrium. This time the variable
to be explained is the standard deviation of the mixing parameter over the last 40 generations of each run
(see Table 2). In this case the regression is not very good, even if some variance is still explained by the
variables. Strikingly, it is the signs of the coefficients which are important. For example, when the variance
of the fitness function σ2S is higher, the fluctuations around the equilibrium are actually smaller. Likewise,
when the slope is higher (increasing towards 0), the fluctuations are smaller. This counter-intuitive results
comes from the fact that the fluctuations depend also on the position of the equilibrium point, which are
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obviously vanishing when fS → 1 or fS → 0.
The conclusion of these two regressions is that the time to convergence and the fluctuations around the
equilibrium are influenced by the stochastic behaviour of the fitness function as well as its general shape.
In physical terms, it means that the air traffic system as idealized by this model can be quite far from
the equilibrium, due to 1) inadequate policies (the slope) 2) the general stochasticity of the system. Hence
policy makers should carefully assess if any changes in policy is likely to have an impact due to the level of
randomness of the system.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented a stylized model of the allocation of flight plans. We used an agent-
based model to simulate the behaviours of different air companies and the network manager. In the model,
different types of air companies are competing for the best paths on the network of sectors and the best
times of departure. Since the sectors are capacity-constrained, in some high traffic conditions the companies
might be forced to choose suboptimal flight plans, according to their strategies or cost function.
When different types of companies are competing on the same airspace, their relative satisfaction depends
highly on the environment – the airspace, the waves of departure – but also the competition – the fractions
of different types of companies. In a nutshell, we find that the companies are performing better when they
are competing against other types of companies, in a mechanism of “niche” leading to behaviours similar to
those of the minority game [23].
As a consequence, it is possible to re-interpret the model as an evolutionary game, through the use of the
difference of satisfactions as a fitness function which sets the capacity of a type of company to expand its
business by having more flights in the future. In this framework the populations are the types of companies
using the “rerouting” or “shifting” strategy. The study of the shape of the fitness function shows the existence
of a stable equilibrium point for the mixing parameter for nearly every values of parameters. Interestingly,
this equilibrium point is distinct from the point where a global satisfaction is optimal for the system as a
whole. This indicates that the system left alone will not converge to the global optimum but to a different
equilibrium point.
In order to study more in details the real dynamics of the system around the point of equilibrium, we
iterated the model with a reproduction rule mimicking the fact that higher satisfaction for an airline may be
converted in better possibilities of expanding business. We found that the dynamical point of equilibrium
is different from the one derived from the root of the fitness function (static equilibrium). This is a purely
dynamical effect which is driving the point of equilibrium even further from the global optimum. Moreover,
we found that both the convergence time to equilibrium and the fluctuations are highly dependent not only
on the slope of the fitness function but also on the variance of the fitness function.
These results have several policy implications. On one hand, the fact that the root of the fitness function
is distinct from the global optimum means that the regulators should step in. Indeed, issuing well-designed
regulations could help the system to have a point of equilibrium closer to the global optimum. On the other
hand, the dynamical effects could blur the picture. Indeed, long time to convergence and high fluctuations
combined with changing business conditions mean in practice that the system is always out of equilibrium.
It is thus hard for the regulators to design incentives to drive the system to the optimum. A more precise
setup and a more detailed calibration would be needed to definitely assert the potential consequences of
regulations.
The model presented here is an idealized version of the reality, a simple, yet phenomenologically rich,
toy-model. It allows however to catch some high-level, emergent, phenomena that are inaccessible to more
complicated ones due to the large number of parameters. The existence of a point of equilibrium, its behaviour
in certain environments, and its dynamics have certainly a scope broader than the present model. Moreover,
the model is not really specific to the air traffic. In fact, it could be adapted to other situations, like packets
propagation over the physical network of the internet, with minimal effort. As such, it can be viewed as a
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quite general model of transportation where entities need to send some material over a capacity-constrained
network, thus competing for time and space.
Two possible directions for extension of the present work are the following. First, it is clear that a more
detailed modelling could allow to draw some more precise conclusions about the present and future scenario
in ATM. A first path has been made in this direction with another version of the model [26], based on
navigation points instead of sectors. The model is also coupled to a tactical part, allowing to simulate the
conflict resolution of traffic controllers. The code for this model is freely available [28]. The second direction
is toward model calibration. This is in general a challenging problem because data on strategic allocation
are owned by companies and hardly available, especially when the details on many airlines are needed. A
potential way of overcome this problem is through indirect calibration based on traffic data which contains
the original flight plan and the last filled one. Data mining techniques could be useful to infer from this data
unobservable parameters of our model and therefore to calibrate it.
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Appendix A. Robustness of the model
In this annex we test the robustness of the model to the simplifying assumptions we made in the main
text. Specifically, we consider two modifications of the baseline model. In the first one, instead of using a
homogeneous network of airports, we use a more realistic one. In the second one, we use real data on airspace
structure and airport network and choose the origin/destination pairs and the desired times accordingly.
Appendix A.1. Scale free network for airports – description
It is well known that the distribution of degree in the airport network follows a power law [9] and
therefore is described by a scale free network. This means that few airports offer a large number of possible
destinations, and many airports only a few possible ones. This is in contrast with the baseline model where
we assumed that all airports are equivalent. In order to see if this feature changes our results, we decided
to use a Baraba´si-Albert type of network. This type of network generates a power law distribution for the
degree (with exponent 3). In the simulations the air companies choose at random an origin/destination pair
based on this airport network, i.e. they have a higher probability to be connected to high degree airports
(hubs) rather than to low degree ones. The other properties of the model remain the same.
Appendix A.2. Real network of sectors – description
For the second type of network, we use some traffic data (DDR) as well as some NEVAC files to have the
definition of the sectors. All this data has been acquired during the course of SESAR funded WP-E project
ELSA, “EmpiricaLly grounded agent baSed models for the future ATM scenario”. More details about the
data itself and the data acquirement process can be found in [27].
For the purpose of testing the model, we used the data in the following way. First, we considered one day
of traffic data, the 5th of June 2010. Since our model is in 2D of space, we needed to project the trajectories
and have a unique tiling of the ECAC space. To this end, we selected FL 350 and considered only sectors
at this altitude2. From each flight trajectories we have extracted the path of sectors it actually followed.
Then we selected only 60 sectors, in order to have results comparable with the previous ones (the generated
networks have 60 sectors). We selected them by considering the most central sectors of the ECAC space
(smallest distances between the center of the network and the center of the ECAC space). The resulting
network of sectors is displayed in figure A.12.
The next step was to extract the times of crossing between sectors. For this, we computed from the traffic
data the average time of flights going from one sector to another one. Because some flights were crossing
only a very small portion of some sectors, we ended up having some strange crossing times (e.g. very small
even for big sectors). So in order to keep the paths geographically sound, we computed the crossing times
between sectors based only on their geographical distance, and tuned the average from all sectors to the
data.
The next step is to set the capacities for the sectors. Unfortunately, we do not have access to this kind of
data. Instead, we decided to rely on the assumptions that the sectors were designed so that their capacity
are only slightly bigger than the maximum traffic load. So we computed the maximum number of flights in
each sector and fix it as the capacity. We are confident on the fact that the resulting capacities reflect at
least the degree of heterogeneity of the capacities between sectors, even if not their absolute values.
The final step is to extract from the data to possible origin/destination pairs and the desired times of
departure. For the pairs, we simply recorded the first and last sectors crossed by the flights in the area.
For the departure times, we assumed that the last filled flight plan available in the data constituted a good
approximation of the desired departure times.
2In order to have a clean tiling, we needed to merge some overlapping sectors, probably active at different times during the
day. Among 364 sectors, only 11 small sectors were slightly modified.
16
Figure A.12: Sector network used for the simulations based on traffic data. The sectors chosen are the ones which are the
closest to the geographical center of the ECAC space (approximately around the Channel), at FL 350. The sectors are linked
to each other if at least one flight goes from one to the other in the traffic data. The orange squares denote the sectors where
there is at least one departure or one arrival. The numbers are arbitrary labels.
We then ran some simulations, changing the number of flights Nf and the mixing parameter fS . For each
set of parameters, we produced 100 simulations. In each of them, each air company first picks at random
an origin/destination pair from the available ones. Then it picks at random a desired departure time among
the available ones. Finally, it picks a strategy (type S or R) with a probability fS .
Appendix A.3. Results
Figure A.13 shows the most important result from the two previous procedures, namely the evolution of
the difference of satisfaction as a function of the mixing parameter fS . For the artificial scale free network of
sectors we varied the time ∆t between waves, while in the simulations on the real network the wave structure
is fixed by the real data and therefore we considered different number of flights N .
Figure A.13 should be compared with figure 6. We observe that the general inverse relation between ∆S
and fS is the same as in the baseline model, i.e. companies are usually performing better when they are
competing against large populations of the other type of company. The real case on the right is just a bit
different in the magnitude of the change of satisfaction. It seems that the effect of the mixing parameter is
weaker in this case. However for large traffic (high N) the inverse relation is very clear.
Appendix B. Analytical derivation of equilibrium for infinite and finite populations
The standard replicator model with two populations [3] fixes the total population size and describes the
dynamics of the fraction of population of a given type (for example companies S). If x(t) ∈ [0, 1] is the
fraction of population of a given type at time t (the other being 1 − x(t)), the dynamics in the infinite
population case is
x˙ = f(x)x(1− x),
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Figure A.13: Simulation results of the two robustness checks of the model. Left: difference of satisfaction ∆S between the two
types of companies as a function of the mixing parameters fS for different values of ∆t for an artificially generated Baraba´si-
Albert airport network. Right: difference of satisfaction as a function of the mixing parameter for different numbers of flights
N , in the case where the network is constructed from real traffic data.
where f(x) is the difference of the fitness between the two populations and x˙ is the derivative of x with
respect to time. In this expression, the fitness function is a deterministic function of one variable, x. Clearly
the equilibrium points of this dynamical system are x = 0, x = 1, and the roots (if any) of f , i.e. the points
where f(xeq) = 0.
However, for finite populations, the fitness can depend on the exact realization of the model, because of
different origin/destination distributions for instance. In order to take this into account, we substitute f(x)
by f(x) + ση, where η is a Gaussian white noise with mean zero and variance 1. The noise term η has a
variance σ2 which goes to zero when the population size goes to infinity. The equation is now a nonlinear
Langevin equation [4]. In order to solve the equation, we linearize it around the point of equilibrium. With
x˜t = xt − xeq and f(x) = γx˜t, where γ (< 0) is the derivative of the fitness at xeq, the equation becomes:
˙˜xt = γxeq(1− xeq)x˜t + (xeq(1− xeq) + (1− 2xeq)x˜t)σηt.
Since the noise term is multiplicative, in order to trasform it in a Stochastic Differential Equation (SDE),
we assume Stratonovich integration [4] and we obtain
dx˜t = ax˜tdt+ (d+ bx˜t)σdWt, (Stratonovich)
where Wt is a Wiener process and where a = γxeq(1− xeq), d = xeq(1− xeq), and b = (1− 2xeq).
We now pass to the Ito formalism3 obtaining
dx˜t = A(B − x˜t)dt+ CσdWt (Ito) (B.1)
where
A = −γxeq(1− xeq)− (1− 2xeq)
2
2
σ2
B =
xeq(1− xeq)(1− 2xeq)σ2
−2γxeq(1− xeq)− (1− 2xeq)2σ2
C = xeq(1− xeq) + (1− 2xeq)x˜t
3Given dXt = αtdt+ βtdWt in Stratonovich sense, the corresponding Ito equation is dXt = (αt +
1
2
βt∂xβt)dt+ βtdWt) [4].
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Equation B.1 is a linear Ito SDE which can be easily solved. The linear drift term A(B− x˜t) tells us that
the dynamics of x˜t is mean reverting around the position B at an exponential rate (−A)−1, when A < 0.
Framed in our problem this fact has two implications:
• The dynamical equilibrium point is x′eq = xeq + B. Since in our model xeq > 1/2, it is x′eq > xeq i.e.
the new equilibrium has a larger fraction of S companies with respect to the value obtained from the
infinite population case.
• The speed of convergence to the equilibrium is (−A−1) which is larger than the zero noise case
(−γxeq(1−xeq))−1. This implies that convergence is reached more slowly than in the infinite population
case.
Therefore, as observed in simulations, the equilibrium in finite populations favors even more S companies
and it is reached at a slower rate that the one predicted by the slope of the fitness at the equilibrium point.
Finally, as expected, when the population size increases, σ → 0 and the infinite dimensional solutions are
recovered.
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